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We investigate the effectiveness of European Structural Funds on employment,
population and house prices in 325 Local Labor Markets (LLM) located in Southern
Italy. We exploit the variability in disbursements between 2007 and 2013 and
estimate the impact of the interventions by allowing for LLM-specific fixed features
and LLM-specific time trends. We find that the ability of these funds to offset the
negative consequences of the economic crisis seems to have been limited.
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Whether place-based policies should be done is an intriguing topic. Economists seem to
be mostly puzzled (see, for instance, Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008; Neumark and Simpson
2014). Nevertheless, supportive arguments have also been proposed (Barca et al. 2012),
and policy makers all around the world implement these policies, spending considerable
amounts of public money (for instance, $95 billion annually in the US, according to the
figures of Kline and Moretti 2013a).
A prominent example of place-based policies is given by the European Union (EU)
Structural Funds (European Regional Development Fund, ERDF, and European Social
Fund, ESF), which target disadvantaged areas and use a significant fraction (278 billion,
28%, in the programing period 2007–2013) of the EU budget. Expenditures under the
Structural Funds include both investments (transport or telecommunications infrastruc-
tures, outlays for innovation, energy, the environment) and labor market programs
(aimed at reducing unemployment and increasing human capital and social integration).
The bulk of Structural Funds expenditure flows to Objective “Convergence” (former
Objective 1) areas, which are EU regions with GDP per capita less than 75% of the EU
average. The aim of the Structural Funds is to increase long-term growth in lagging
regions and make it sustainable. Since 2008, however, the EU Commission encouraged
using the funds to offset the negative consequences of the economic crisis, through an
acceleration of the execution of the programs, originally planned over a 7-year horizon,
and a re-orientation of the financing towards counter-cyclical interventions (European
Commission 2008a, b).
We investigate the effectiveness of Structural Funds on a number of outcomes (employ-
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allows us to geo-reference payments relative to projects funded by the European Structural
Funds. Unfortunately, comparable data at this detailed level of geo-stratification do not
exist for other countries. We focus on 325 Local Labor Markets (LLM) located in Southern
Italy, as this is a traditional example of a disadvantaged area in the EU. The choice of
considering only Southern regions is motivated by the fact that they were the target of
most of the European transfers. In the programing period 2007–13, more than 80% of the
total financing at the national level was allocated to this area. Furthermore, given that one
of the main challenges for the evaluation is to address the potentially diverging trends in
disadvantaged LLMs, the choice of excluding Northern and Central Italy aims at reducing
the degree of heterogeneity. Regions located in the South showed quite different trends in
employment, population and house prices during the period of interest, as they were more
strongly hit by the recession.
Our identification strategy exploits the variability in disbursements across LLMs be-
tween 2007 and 2013. It refers, therefore, to the years of the economic crisis. We estimate
the effect of these payments on the growth rates of the outcomes, controlling for both
LLM-specific time-invariant features and LLM-specific time trends. In particular, to
account for omitted time-varying factors, we include a long set of fixed LLM characteris-
tics interacted with linear and quadratic time trends. Given that this procedure requires
including a very long vector of covariates, we select them according to the procedure
suggested by Belloni et al. (2014). Including controls for local traits and dynamics should
help in isolating the effects of the funds from those associated with the concurrent deteri-
orating economic conditions experienced by the LLMs during the severe recession.
Our estimates are, basically, diff-in-diffs estimates (with a continuous treatment). In the
absence of a policy rule (i.e., a discontinuity) that might allow to isolate the exogenous
variation of the transfers, we try to reduce the role of omitted time-varying variables by
controlling for an extensive list of LLM-specific traits that should help in predicting local
trends. Obviously, our empirical approach might have limitations, insofar one cannot
ensure that all the sources of local dynamics are successfully differentiated away. These
limitations, however, should be weighed against the benefits of having timely empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of the interventions carried out during the current program-
ming period (2007–13) of the EU Structural Funds, which can be also useful to inform
the design of the interventions in the next stage (2014–20).
Our results suggest that the EU funding had limited impact on employment.
Estimates for the effect of cumulate payments (over 2007–13) on average growth do
not detect any effect. Some small increase in employment, however, seems to be asso-
ciated with the acceleration/re-targeting of payments started in 2011. Across the
categories of expenditures, our findings suggest that the EU money channeled
through incentives and the purchase of goods and services might have had a slightly
more favorable impact on employment compared to money spent on infrastructure.
We also do not find any effect whatsoever of the Structural Funds on both population
and house prices. The upshot of overall ineffectiveness seems to confirmed even for
the LLMs characterized by very low employment or very low initial housing prices.
Next, we verify whether a faster disbursement might have implied a more encour-
aging impact of the scheme on the local economies and find that this is unlikely to be
case. We finally show that results do not seem to be affected by the presence of other
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poses as well.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates the conceptual frame-
work. Section 3 presents the related literature, while the fourth one provides the relevant
institutional details. Section 5 describes the identification strategy, while 6 explains the
data. The results are illustrated in Section 7. Concluding thoughts are offered in Section 8.
2 Conceptual framework
Place-based policies aim to spur development in underperforming areas. Theoretically,
market imperfections can potentially justify public intervention. A classic example refers
to the under-provision of public goods (e.g., roads) by the private sector. Another instance
is that of labor markets with search frictions and hiring costs, where place-based hiring
subsidies may improve efficiency if introduced in those areas where the productivity of a
match is lower (Kline and Moretti 2013b). A list of other potential justifications for inter-
ventions, ranging from agglomeration economies to network effects, can be found, for
instance, in Kline and Moretti (2013a) and Neumark and Simpson (2014). The bottom
line is that “localized” market failures, of any nature, can be addressed by “localized,” or
place-based, policies. This amounts to say that, on theoretical grounds, place-based
policies might have the potential to increase local efficiency.
Obviously, market imperfections can be difficult to detect. Economically disadvantaged
areas usually feature several market failures, rather than a single one, so it is not clear
what the priority of the policies should be. Moreover, interventions that aim to modify the
incentives for the private agents, such as a subsidy scheme, may not be effective or may
induce unintended behavior (see, for instance, the literature review in Accetturo and de
Blasio 2012). Most of the time, the households and firms’ behavior is similar to the one
they would show in the counterfactual scenario of no scheme. Finally, political economy
mechanisms (see Krueger 1974, Signorini and Visco 2002, and Besley 2004) suggest that
transferring resources to disadvantaged areas could itself be harmful because it might
enhance rent-seeking and increase the payoff for deviant behaviors (such as corruption).
Whether place-based policies increase local efficiency is, therefore, an empirical ques-
tion. Employment is a natural proxy to measure the impact of the interventions be-
cause many such programs list job creation for local residents as one of the primary
objectives. However, there could be benefits to the local community that are not capitalized
in additional employment. Roback-type models of spatial equilibrium (Glaeser 2008) high-
light that the presence of location-specific factors positively related to firms’ productivity
and households’ welfare will result in higher prices for non-tradable factors, such as hous-
ing. The dynamic of population is also an interesting outcome to look at, given that resi-
dential choices are motivated by the benefits accruing to mobile households. For these
reasons, our empirical investigation provides a joint assessment of the impact of the Struc-
tural Funds on employment, population movements and house prices. Looking at the three
outcomes at the same time should also help in disentangling the equity implications of the
interventions. Standard spatial equilibrium models predict that, in a world where workers
are perfectly mobile and housing supply is completely inelastic, the entire benefits of place-
based policies will be picked up by housing values. Less extreme circumstances — such as
less mobile workers or elastic housing — imply that the intervention can affect the utility
of infra-marginal workers.
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Neumark and Simpson (2014) provide an up-to-date review of the evaluation studies
carried out for place-based policies. More related to our paper, a number of studies refer
to evaluations at the EU-wide level. By using standard regression techniques, the effective-
ness of the EU financing for regional GDP growth was questioned by Boldrin and Canova
(2001) and Sala-i-Martin (1996). Recently, however, by employing RDD (regression
discontinuity design) identification strategies that exploit the 75% threshold for Objective
1 (which is the bulk of cohesion policy and European transfers) eligibility, Becker et al.
(2010) and Pellegrini et al. (2013) argue that the receipt of Structural Funds is associated
with an annual per capita GDP increase of about 1–1.5 percentage points over a EU
programing period (7 years). On the other hand, Accetturo et al. (2014), using the same
empirical framework, show that transfers might have unintended consequences on the
local endowments of social capital and cooperation. While the credibility at the threshold
of these exercises is typically not an issue, the external validity for regions far from the
cutoff is a major drawback, especially for exercises that aim to inform policy. A step
forward towards results that can be deemed as more general is the study by Becker et al.
(2012), which uses GPS (generalized propensity score) methods and finds that effective-
ness is a scattered upshot in the European landscape and that for a number of regions a
reduction of the EU funding would not reduce their growth. Finally, Becker et al. (2013)
show that the effect estimated exploiting the RDD design is highly heterogeneous at the
threshold, as it depends strongly on the absorptive capacity of a region, as measured by
human capital and the quality of institutions. Areas characterized by low absorptive cap-
acity display a small and not significant effect, while the gains are concentrated in a subset
of lagging-behind regions who have relatively better institutions and/or human capital.
Another stream of empirical investigations refers to specific place-based policies imple-
mented in Italy, and financed (at least partially) with EU money. In this case, the evidence
seems to be less encouraging. Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) find that a major incentive
scheme (Law 488/1992) intended to subsidize firms located in economically depressed
areas had only little impact on firms’ investment. Accetturo and de Blasio (2012) suggest
that “Patti Territoriali,” a program based on a bottom-up approach with the local commu-
nity playing a leading role in designing the development plan, made no difference for the
economic fortunes of the areas. Andini and de Blasio (2014) argue that “Contratti di
Programma,” an intervention by means of which the Government approves and finances
industrial projects proposed by private firms, had limited effects on local growth (and
mostly at the expenses of the surrounding territories). Finally, the only paper that deals
with overall EU funding effectiveness in Italy, irrespective of the specific program through
which the money is channeled into the economy, is Giua (2014). She considers in a RDD
set-up the differences in employment growth across municipalities on the two sides of the
Objective 1 border and finds a positive impact on employment.
Compared with the previous literature, our paper has a number of novelties. Firstly, it
uses data from the 2007–13 EU programing period. All the previous empirical studies
refer to older programing periods. Thanks to the availability of high-quality data (with
localization details) of the website OpenCoesione, we are able to estimate the impact of
the EU funding on a number of local outcomes, which, at the time of writing, are measur-
able until 2013. Our estimation window covers the period of the financial and economic
crisis. Therefore, our findings provide hints about the countercyclical impact of the EU
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Indeed, as we explain below, many programs were re-targeted explicitly to address the
strains of the downturn. Given that we are studying a timespan of exceptional economic
circumstances, it might be hard to imagine that our findings could provide lessons for
periods with less extreme conditions.
Secondly, and differently from the papers based on a RDD-type framework, our infer-
ence refers to the universe of Southern Italy’s areas covered under the policy, not only to
those close to thresholds of eligibility.
Thirdly, we provide an evaluation of the impact of the EU structural funds taken as a
whole, irrespective of the specific programs through which the money is channeled,
although we also document the differential impacts for some broad categories of expend-
iture. In this respect, our paper shares the motivation of the studies that up to now have
been conducted at the EU-wide level. With respect to them, the main limitation is that we
focus on a single area: the South of Italy. On the one hand, our restricted focus limits the
possibility of drawing lessons for other EU countries. On the other hand, it limits the
amount of unobserved heterogeneity that may bias the results.
4 Institutional details
The Structural Funds represent financial instruments of the EU regional policy, intended
to pursue the goal of economic, social and territorial cohesion by narrowing the develop-
ment disparities among regions and member states. For the period 2007–2013, the budget
allocated to the Structural Funds amounts to around € 278 billion, which represents 28%
of the Community budget. There are two Structural Funds: the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (ERDF), set up in 1975, providing support for the creation of infrastructures
and productive job-creating investment, mainly for businesses; the European Social Fund
(ESF), set up in 1958, contributes to the integration into working life of the unemployed
and disadvantaged sections of the population, mainly by funding training measures. The
bulk of Structural Funds expenditure flows to Objective “Convergence” (former Objective
1) areas, which are EU regions with GDP per capita less than 75% of the EU average.
Structural Funds always involve co-financing from national sources.
The aim of the EU Structural Funds is to increase long-term sustainable growth of the
lagging areas. However, soon after the outbreak of the crisis, the European Commission
put forward a recovery plan in which it encouraged the use of EU Structural Funds for
counter-cyclical aims (European Commission 2008a, b). In particular, the Commission
suggested increasing the spending through the combination of both EU funding and na-
tional budgetary stimulus packages, which should be coordinated in order to avoid negative
spillovers across countries (European Commission 2008a). With regard to money available
for the cohesion policy, the recovery plan envisaged to accelerate program implementation
rather than to increase funding per se. It translated into an ease of administrative proce-
dures, an increase of projects pre-financing and a decrease of national co-funding share,
allowing countries to increase up-front spending as the pressure on national budget con-
straints is reduced. The Commission encouraged member States to “re-prioritize” cohesion
investments in view of the ongoing turbulent economic situation: it invited national gov-
ernments “to explore possible changes in priorities and objectives with a view to accelerate
the spending in the areas with more growth potential. This could include more focus on
energy efficiency measures, including in housing, and strengthening the focus of support
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economy.” (European Commission 2008b, pg. 4).
With the 2011 “Piano di Azione e Coesione,” (see resolution 1/2011 of the Inter-ministry
Committee for the Economic Planning, “CIPE”), the Italian Government followed the EU
suggestion. A number of actions were taken, both to ensure faster spending (also through
ring-fencing of specific programs, which execution was moved from local to national
competencies) and re-focusing the existent programs towards counter-cyclical aims, among
which wage supplementation schemes and subsidies to SMEs had a prominent role.
5 Identification strategy
We focus on the effect of payments related to the European Structural Funds on the
growth Δyit in employment, population and housing prices at the local level. Here the
subscript i refers to the Local Labor Markets (LLMs), which are geographical areas
designed by the National Statistical Institute to be approximately a self-contained com-
muting zone (Istat 1997). Each LLM is defined by aggregating municipalities through an
algorithm that, on the basis of commuting to work matrices built from the 2001 Popula-
tion Census, maximizes the share of resident commuters that move only between munici-
palities within the LLM (the supply side) and the share of workers that come from within
the LLM (the demand side).1 The algorithm does not impose contiguity, which is obtained
ex-post by reallocating ad-hoc the small number of municipalities (less than 1%) that are
assigned by the algorithm to a non-contiguous LLM. We defer to Istat (1997) for a more
detailed description.
We restrict our analysis to the 325 LLMs that are located in Southern Italy, which
includes eight regions: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and
Sardinia. LLMs are not constrained to administrative boundaries, and, therefore, one
LLM may contain municipalities that belong to different regions. For the definition of
Southern Italy, we included only LLMs for which the central municipality (defined as the
one which attracts the most commuters from other municipalities) belongs to the listed
regions. In practice, the overlapping is rather limited. We excluded 13 small municipalities
(with a population amounting to around the 0.3% of residents in Southern regions in
2007) that belong to Southern regions but are part of LLMs that do not match our defin-
ition of “Southern Italy LLMs.” On the opposite, we included 7 (0.04% of residents in
Southern regions in 2007) that are part of Central Italy, but are included in the LLM
named after Avezzano, a town located in Abruzzo.
The first difference operator Δ refers to a proportional change (growth). We estimate
the effect of annual per-capita payments dit on annual growth, taking 2007 as the starting
point (see Section 6 for a discussion of this choice):





E Δεit ln ditð Þ; γt
  ¼ 0; ð3Þ
where t = 2008,…,2013. To account for the overall effect, we also estimate the impact ofcumulative per-capita payments ci on the average 2008–13 growth in outcomes






E Δεi ln cið Þ; γ0
  ¼ 0 ð6Þ
The focus on the average growth rates allows us to account for the possibility that the
impact of EU funding spreads over the entire period (in section 7.8 we also estimate year-
to-year models including lags of ln(dit)). From the econometric point of view, the use of
both average and annual growth is important because it allows us to exploit alternatively
both sources of variability, cross-sectional (between LLMs) and overtime (within LLMs).
The main problem with both regressions (1) and (4) is that more funds may have
been transferred to those LLMs that would have shown, even in the absence of the
policy, a stronger negative trend. This might well be the case since (part of) the original
allocation of funds has been re-targeted and the disbursement accelerated to fulfill
countercyclical purposes (see Section 4).2 Available solutions to this problem depend
on the type of specification (year-to-year or average) adopted.
5.1 Solutions for local time-varying omitted variables for the year-to-year specifications
By exploiting the year-to-year variability as in equation (1), we can experiment with a
number of different strategies. First of all, we can control for LLM-specific linear time
trends by adding fixed effects gi , which would capture a constant growth over the years
for each LLM:
Δyit ¼ δ ln ditð Þ þ γt þ gi þ Δεit : ð7Þ
For equation (7) to be consistently estimated by OLS, we need a strict exogeneitycondition:
E Δεis ln ditð Þ; γt ;gi
  ¼ 0 ∀s; t: ð8Þ
Shocks Δεit must be, conditional on time and LLM effects γt and gi , uncorrelated
with payments in all time periods. This condition means that current payments should
be unrelated not only with current shocks on the local economy, but also with past and
future shocks. The latter scenario is not unreasonable: it is likely that areas where the
recession was stronger felt have been able to attract more payments later. To check
whether strict exogeneity holds with our data, we run the test suggested by Wooldridge
(2010, p. 325), which amounts to adding the lead of the covariate of interest and test
whether it is significant in the regression.
The introduction of fixed effects in eq. (7) captures LLM-specific linear trends.
However, there may be quadratic or cubic trends that would require introducing
additional interactions between the LLM fixed effects and higher order time trends in the
regression. This is not feasible given the short length of our data. We exploit a different
strategy, based on a set of time-invariant covariates fi′. We introduce them in a year-to-
year regression, and we also interact them with a linear time trend t and its square. Given
that the regression is already in first difference, this allows for linear, quadratic and cubic
trends that depend on these pre-determined variables:
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In this case, the necessary exogeneity condition is:E Δεit ln ditð Þ; γt ; f i0; t
  ¼ 0: ð10Þ
Condition (10) differs from the one required for FE estimation. On the one hand,it allows for higher order time trends (although in a simplified way), and it does
not require strict exogeneity (only the error Δεit at time t has to be uncorrelated
with payments at time t). On the other hand, it requires covariates included in fi′
to be good proxies of the unobservable so that the OLS coefficient on ln(dit) is a
consistent estimator for the true effect of the payments.
The vector fi′ includes an extensive set of local variables, which are time-invariant:
employment, unemployment and activity rates in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007; (log of )
the outcomes (employment, population and house prices) in 2004, 2005, 2006 and
2007; the growth of the outcomes over 2004–07; the total surface (in kmq), popula-
tion density in 2007, average altitude, the fraction of the surface composed of moun-
tain municipalities and that referring to municipalities located on the coast, total
number of houses per capita (census 2001 on population 2007) and total number of
empty houses per capita (census 2001 on population 2007). In order to account for
differential cyclical trends, we also control for sector composition by including the
2007 share of private workers in construction, trade services, and other services (con-
sidering manufacturing as the excluded category).3 Finally, we also add the logarithm
(and its square) of the public funds that were allocated at the beginning of the pro-
graming period. This variable captures additional pre-treatment heterogeneity, as
higher allocations reflect deeper underperformances. Furthermore, conditioning on it,
we are able to capture the effect of actual spending given the theoretically available
funds. This is an interesting quantity, given that most of the recent policy debate was
focused on the ability of using the most of the available funds (see, also, section 7.5).
The strategy of including LLM characteristics interacted with time trends, as ar-
gued by Belloni et al. (2014), implies adding a very long set of covariates, which
may hinder the precision of the estimators and create problems for standard infer-
ence. The authors suggest the selection of a smaller set of variables using a
“double selection method.” Instead of assuming that one needs to control for the
entire list of variables (fi′, t × fi′, t
2 × fi′), they assume that there is a smaller set of
covariates such that, once controlling for them, ln(dit) can be considered exogen-
ous. The problem is that this subset is a priori unknown. The standard procedure
would be to consider only those variables that the researcher or the literature con-
sider more relevant. Differently, Belloni et al. (2014) propose to select them by
using a Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO), which mini-
mizes the sum of squared residuals and an additional penalty parameter that aims
to reduce the overall size of the model. We defer to their paper for details about
the operator.4 The selection must be conducted on the two reduced forms
Δyit ¼ βyt þ f i0βy1 þ t  f i0βy2 þ t2  f i0βy3 þ Δvyit ð11Þ
ln ditð Þ ¼ βdt þ f i0βd1 þ t  f i0βd2 þ t2  f i0βd3 þ Δvdit ; ð12Þ
and the final set of variables should be the union of those selected in (11) and
(12). The reason is that the selection aims to maximize the predictive power of the
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5.2 Solutions for local time-varying omitted variables for the average growth
specifications
In eq. (4) it is not possible to introduce LLM fixed-effects. We can therefore only add
the vector of LLM-specific time-invariant variables fi′. Given that the regression is in
first-differences, introducing these covariates allows for counterfactual linear time
trends that depends on pre-determined differences in these variables:
Δ6yi ¼ δ ln cið Þ þ γ0 þ f i0ωþ Δεi: ð13Þ
For OLS to consistently estimate the true effect of cumulative payments, we need pay-ments and shocks Δεit to be uncorrelated given the LLM characteristics included in fi′.
Additionally, we also implement the Belloni et al. (2014) procedure to estimate eq. (13).
6 Data and descriptive statistics
The information on payments and allocations comes from the OpenCoesione website.5
It collects all the information relative to projects at least partially funded by EU Struc-
tural Funds. The variable on payments not only include the money coming from the
European funds, but also the co-financing from the Italian Government (or local
authorities) and, in some cases, from the private sector. Importantly, the data provides
geo-referenced information about the targeted places. Although the majority of the
projects (around 97%) take place at the level of municipalities, in some cases they refer
to the higher administrative levels of provinces or regions.6 In these cases, we re-
allocated the spending to the municipalities on the basis of the 2007 population.
Projects at the national level have been excluded. Given that we use geographical
variation as source of heterogeneity, they would be of no help in estimating the effect.
Anyway, at the end of 2013 the cumulative payments relative to projects at the national
level amounted to only 2.3% of those relative to projects at the sub-national level,
which we use in the analysis.
In the cases in which national funds were used for projects funded also through EU
Structural Funds, the relative money (co-financing) is already included in our variable.
There are nevertheless some projects that are only funded by national sources (in par-
ticular, the “Fondo per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione”). Their role seems to be limited. For
Southern Italy the cumulative payments over 2007–13 relative to national funds only
amounted to 0.6 billion euros against a total of 19.4 billion euros relative to projects
funded at least partially by EU Funds. We decided not to include expenditures only
financed by national sources in our main regressions because they follow procedures
different from the ones where EU money is at stake, but we conducted a robustness
check by adding them (see: para. 7.6). All variables relative to payments are expressed
in per-capita terms, using only the population in 2007 as the denominator.
In the regressions for annual growth, we focus only on changes and transfers over
the period 2008–13, taking year 2007 at the starting point. Although some payment
were also made during that year, their impact is likely to be negligible: with regard to
Southern LLMs, only 400 million was spent in 2007, which is 1.7% of the total expend-
iture over the entire period.
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is obtained from Istat Intercensus demographic balance reconstruction. House prices per
sqm come from the Osservatorio Immobiliare. Data were aggregated at the municipality
level with the procedure described in Cannari and Faiella (2008). Given that they are
released every semester, we took a simple average over the whole year. In order to aggre-
gate them at the LLM level, we use the 2007 local population as a weight.
We did not make substantial alterations to the original data. We only censored the
annual changes in house prices at the 1st and 99th percentile of the overall pooled distribu-
tion because there were some relevant outliers. In some LLMs in a few years the annual
payments were zero or less than one euro per-capita, and they could also be negative in
the case of reimbursement of previous payments relative to projects that were stopped.
These are overall very few cases: the LLM-year observations with payments amounting to
less than one euro per-capita were less than one percent in the total pooled sample and
around 3% in 2008, and there was only one case with a small per-capita negative
payment. We simply imposed the logarithm to be zero in those years. Log cumulate
payments are positive in all LLMs.
Figure 1 shows the trends in the outcomes over the entire period in the Southern Italy.
Employment decreases significantly by approximately 10%. Population remains approxi-
mately constant, with a small smooth increase. House prices initially increase in 2008;
they do not decrease much during the initial part of the crisis, while they decline by
around 5% during the last two years. Payments relative to projects financed by EU Struc-
tural Funds appear to be countercyclical. They are negligible in 2007, they start to be
economically significant in 2008 and then they increase in 2009–10. In 2011 we observe a
significant increase, up to 200 euros per capita, which follows the actions taken by the
Italian government to speed-up the spending and refocusing the programs (see Section 4).
The increase in payments is made clear in Fig. 2, which shows the distribution of pay-
ments across LLMs by year. The amount of transfers remained at the higher level during
2012 and 2013. The variability over time and across areas is quite substantial. Given thatFig. 1 Annual European Structural Funds payments (euro/capita, right axis) and trends in employment,
population and house prices (index 2007 = 100, left axis), 2007–2013, Southern Italy; Notes: Annual payments
are per-capita, calculated divided total payments to Southern Italy by total Southern population in 2007.
Employment data are from Labor Force Surveys, house price per sqm from Osservatorio Immobiliare
(aggregated at the area level by weighting with 2007 population), population from Istat intercensus
reconstruction, annual payments from Opencoesione website
Fig. 2 Density of annual per-capita payments, Southern Italy LLMs; Notes: Payments are on a log-scale.
Densities are estimated using a kernel density estimator and Silverman’s rule of thumb bandwidth
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of variability within single local areas. In the overall sample, the within LLMs variance
accounts for 44% of the total variance (after removing year fixed effects). The fraction is
still very similar (40%) if we exclude the first year, when payments were lower. It remains
quite high even if we consider single pair of years (around 15–20%).
Figure 3 displays the geographical pattern of the cumulative per-capita payments over
2007–13. The heterogeneity is quite substantial, also between LLMs located next to each
other. Puglia (South-East) and Calabria (the last part of mainland before Sicily), both part
of the “Convergence” target, are characterized by a stronger intensity of per-capita pay-
ments in most of their LLMs. The other two “Convergence” regions, Campania (in the
mainland on the West coast) and Sicily received substantial amount of funding, but they
are more concentrated in specific LLMs (e.g., the area of Naples in Campania). Sardinia,
despite not being part of the core “Converge” regions, managed to spend a large fraction
Fig. 3 Map of the Southern Italy LLMs by quartile of the cumulative per-capita payments over 2007–13
(intervals in euro)
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located at the top of the map (in the mainland), although some local labor markets still
received significant amounts of payments.
Figure 4 displays the scatterplot and raw correlation between growth in output and the
logarithm of per-capita payments. Growth rates have been detrended by removing aver-
ages across all LLMs to account for the overall trend that would induce a strong negative
correlation between annual changes in employment and cumulate payments. Annual
growth in outcomes does not display any significant relation with payments: basically,
linear fits are flat and the scatterplot does not highlight any particular relation (nor sens-
ible outliers). Average growth seems to be negatively correlated with cumulative per-
capita payments over 2007–13, while the relationships with population and house prices
are not statistically significant (though respectively positive and negative).
Additional descriptive statistics on variables of interest are reported in the Additional
file 1.7 Results
7.1 Main results
Table 1 shows simple regressions of the growth in the outcomes over the logarithm of the
flow of per-capita payments. The annual growth rates (Columns 1, 2, and 3) display no
Fig. 4 Growth in employment, population, and house prices in Southern Italy LLMs with respect to per-capita
European Structural funds payments. Annual growth on the left and average 2008–2013 growth on the right;
a Employment b Population c House price per sqm; Notes: Growth rates are detrended by removing the
average (by year for annual changes) across all LLMs. See Table 1 for data sources. Average 2008–13 is a
geometric average. Figures display a linear fit with 95% confidence interval (s.e. clustered at the LLM level)
Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:20 Page 13 of 31significant correlation, with negligible coefficients from the economic perspective. Differ-
ently, in Column 4, where we consider the average outcome growth, a 10% increase in
per-capita cumulative payments (equivalent to approximately 76 euros if evaluated at the
average among LLMs) is associated with a 0.027% decrease in employment. This correl-
ation is in line with the possibility that funds have been directed towards those areas that
have been hit more strongly by the crisis. Population and house prices (specifications 5
and 6) do not show any association with cumulative funds over the entire period.
Table 2 shows the regression results relative to annual growth in the outcomes (the
variable of interest is the log of annual per-capita flow of payments). For each outcome,
we start by introducing FE to account for linear trends. Then we add both fi′ and a full
set of interactions with t and t2 to account for higher order time trends. Finally, we
Table 1 The effects of European Structural Funds, Southern Italy, 2008-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual 2008–2013 growth in: Average 2008–2013 growth in:
Employment Population House price
per sqm










Obs 1950 1950 1950 325 325 325
R2 0.2152 0.0471 0.2460 0.0124 0.0069 0.0029
Note:
The unit of observation is the LLM over time. Data on payments come from Open-coesione. Employment refers to the
average annual employment from the LFS survey. Population is obtained from ISTAT data (inter-census reconstruction). Price
per square meter is from OMI, aggregated at the municipality level using the method described in Cannari and Faiella (2008).
The regressions include a constant and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses (robust s.e. for
average growth). The average growth over 2008–13 is calculated as a geometric average
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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et al. (2014). There seems to be no evidence of an effect of the EU funding on employ-
ment (Columns 1, 2, and 3). FE estimates seem to uncover an effect on population
(Column 4) and house prices (Column 7), but they disappear when we introduce covar-
iates interacted with time trends (Columns 5 and 8, respectively). The absence of any
effect is confirmed by focusing only on the subset of selected covariates, which are
reported (Columns 6 and 9). It is important to highlight that the “double selection”
keeps some interactions with the time trend only for the house price regression,
suggesting that heterogeneous time trends are particularly important for this outcome.
With regard to FE estimates, the strict exogeneity test does not suggest any particular
problem, as we fail to reject the null that the lead of annual per capita payments is not
significant when added to the regression.
Table 3 displays the results from regressions for the average growth on the log of
cumulative per-capita payments. For each outcome we show specifications that alterna-
tively include the full set of pre-determined variables fi′ to account for potentially different
trends during the recession and only the subset of covariates selected using Belloni et al.'s
(2014) “double selection” strategy. As for employment (Columns 1 and 2), we find a
coefficient on (log) cumulative per-capita payments that is very small and not statistically
significant. The negative effect found without controlling for time-varying proxies (Table 1,
Column 4) disappears. However, the absence of an effect on population (Columns 3 and
4) is confirmed. Differently from Table 1, Column 6, the inclusion of covariates (Column
5 and 6) seems to uncover a negative effect on house prices.
We also experimented by restricting the analysis to those regions belonging to the
“Convergence” objective (Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily), which are the most
disadvantaged areas where the bulk of the available funding is allocated.7 Results (available
upon request) for average growth and cumulate per-capita payments are similar to those
presented in Table 3, apart from a negative, but statistically significant only at the 10%
level, coefficient in the employment regression. Regressions for annual growth confirm
the main findings from Table 2, with all the coefficients neither statistically nor economic-
ally significant.
Table 2 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth, controlling for LLM time invariant characteristics and differential time trends
Annual 2008–13
growth in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(annual per capita
payments)t
0.0028 0.0010 0.0014 −0.0004** −0.0000 −0.0003 0.0063** 0.0012 0.0029
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0021)




−0.0756 −0.0034** −0.0052 0.0002 0.2453*** 0.0034




−0.0015 −0.0004 0.0010* 0.0183
(0.0152) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0172)
fraction of surface composed
of municipalities in a
mountain area
−0.0084 0.00132 0.0300* 0.0055*
(0.0131) (0.0017) (0.0157) (0.0031)
unemployment rate2006 −7.5712** −0.0243 −5.4767* −0.1442***
(3.5826) (0.3705) (3.2750) (0.0524)
ln(employment)2006 2.0891 0.1027 0.0008*** 1.0234
(1.2758) (0.2218) (0.0002) (1.4014)
population growth 2004-07 −1.7737 0.2652*** 0.6807 0.2124*** 1.2108
(2.7249) (0.0278) (0.4949) (0.0109) (4.6594)
house price growth 2004-07 0.0881 −0.0170 0.0022** −0.6140***
(0.1615) (0.0201) (0.0010) (0.1818)
share trade services workers
2007
−0.0980 −0.0002 0.0084*** 0.1629**
(0.0658) (0.0081) (0.0026) (0.0636)
housing units pc × time2 −0.0124 0.0016 −0.0009 0.0008***














Table 2 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth, controlling for LLM time invariant characteristics and differential time trends (Continued)
unemployment rate2006 ×
time
14.0820*** 0.1115 6.8283 0.0469***
(4.9298) (0.5247) (4.4299) (0.0095)
ln(house price
per sqm)2006 × time
0.0694 −0.0036 0.2550*** −0.0061***
(0.0620) (0.0079) (0.0774) (0.0007)
Additional controls LLM FE All remaining
variables in




LLM FE All remaining
variables in




LLM FE All remaining
variables in




Obs 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950
R2 0.2350 0.3403 0.2354 0.1519 0.6745 0.5934 0.3302 0.5170 0.3074
Strict exog test 0.2892 0.6070 0.1941
Note:
The regressions include a constant and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. See Table 1 for data sources. f 0i is a vector of pre-determined covariates: the employment rate, unemployment
rate, activity rate, and level of the outcomes (in logarithm) for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007; the growth of the outcomes over 2004–07; total surface (in kmq), population density in 2007, average altitude, fraction of
surface composed of municipalities in a mountain area, fraction composed of municipalities located on the coast, total number of houses per capita (census 2001 on population 2007) and total number of empty
houses per capita (census 2001 on population 2007); 2007 share of private workers in construction, trade services, and other services (considering manufacturing as the excluded category); logarithm of originally
allocated funds (and its square). Columns (1), (4), (7) include only LLM FE, with no additional controls. Controls in columns (3), (6), (9) have been selected using the “double selection” of Belloni et al. (2014) and
the code provided by the authors. Columns (2), (5), (8) include all f ′i , fi′ × t and fi′ × t
2, but only coefficients on those that are also “double selected” are shown (a full regression table is available from the authors).
The strict exogeneity test is the p-value for a test for H0: ln(annual pc payments)t+1 = 0














Table 3 The effects of European Structural Funds on average 2008–13 growth, controlling for LLM
time invariant characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average 2008–2013 growth in:
Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(cumulative pc payments
07–13)
−0.0001 −0.0035 0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0118** −0.0093**
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0049) (0.0044)
Controls selected by the double selection procedure:
ln(allocated per capita funds) −0.0156 0.0003 0.0021 0.0004 0.0124 0.0072**
(0.0126) (0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0293) (0.0032)
fraction of surface composed
of municipalities on the coast
−0.0017 0.0004 0.0017*** 0.0112**
(0.0022) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0049)
ln(house price per sqm)2005 0.0541*** 0.0051*** 0.0001 0.0149
(0.0182) (0.0016) (0.0054) (0.0309)
ln(employment)2006 0.1356 −0.0471 0.0005*** 1.6895***
(0.2104) (0.0549) (0.0002) (0.3555)
ln(house price per sqm)2006 0.0012 0.0012 −0.1604*** −0.0186***
(0.0158) (0.0051) (0.0334) (0.0035)
ln(house price per sqm)2007 −0.0664** 0.0257*** 0.0008 0.0241
(0.0284) (0.0083) (0.0005) (0.0915)
population growth 2004-07 −0.3647 0.2179*** 0.0946 0.2158*** −0.4706
















Obs 325 325 325 325 325 325
R2 0.5031 0.2719 0.8396 0.7771 0.4836 0.1145
Note:
The unit of observation is the LLM over time. See Table 1 for data sources. The regressions include a constant. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The average growth over 2008–13 is calculated as a geometric average. See Table 2 for
the full list of covariates. Controls in columns (2), (4), (6) have been selected using the “double selection” of Belloni et al.
(2014) and the code provided by the authors. Columns (1), (3), (5) include all fi′, but only coefficients on those that are
also “double selected” are shown (full regressions table are available from the authors)
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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programing period have also been disbursed because of the n + 2 rule (according to
which the allocated money should be spent within two years of the budgeting).
Disbursements referring to the 2000–06 programing period are not registered in
OpenCoesione. Therefore, failing to account for this financing might impair our
ability to detect an effect for the 2007–14 funding as we have two years in which
payments overlap. To account for this, we shorten our estimation window by exclud-
ing the growth in years 2008 and 2009. Results (available upon request) referring
to this period are very similar to those depicted in Tables 2 and 3. The main
exception refers to a statistically significant and positive effect on employment in the
year-to-year specifications only, with an economic magnitude, however, very close to
zero. This effect is similar to the small positive effects in 2010–11 and 2011–12 that
we find when we focus on single couples of years (see section 7.2) and when we
include lags of the explanatory variable (which forces us to exclude the first two years;
see section 7.8).
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attenuated the impact of the recession on the most vulnerable LLMs. In this case, we ex-
pect that payments had an effect on the lowest percentiles of the distribution of growth
rates in the outcomes. We run quantile regressions for the 25th and 75th percentiles of the
distribution, both without any covariates and with those that were retained after “double
selection”. Results are in line with those referring to the average and discussed in the text.
Finally, the choice of outcomes may be debatable. Private employment can be affected
more by these transfers. Similarly, population mobility is typically stronger for younger
individuals. We also estimated the main regressions (Tables 1–3) using as the outcome the
growth in the private employment in plants located in the area from the Istat Statistical
Archive on Active Enterprises (an annual census of the private sector). Data are currently
available only up to the year 2012. Results for the average 2007–2012 growth show no effect
of the EU transfers. Estimates for annual growth are statistically significant, but only when
we include the long list of covariates, and they are anyway small in economic terms: around
0.07% increase in employment with a 10% increase in per capita payments (similar to other
results found for specific years; see Section 7.2). We also re-estimated the main regressions
using the population between 25 and 34 years of age. The empirical relation turns out to be
negative, but never larger (across the different methods) than a 0.10% decrease with a 10%
increase in per capita payments. Similar results, negative but smaller in size, hold for the
age classes 25–44 and 15–64.7.2 Did the 2011 “Piano di Azione e Coesione” have any effect?
As explained in Section 4, in 2011 a number of actions were taken to ensure faster
spending and a re-focusing of the existent programs towards counter-cyclical aims. To
inspect whether these actions had any impulse on the effectiveness of funds, we
replicated the regressions for annual growth by selecting couples of annual growth rates
(to have specifications that still allow us to include LLM fixed-effects).
With respect to employment (Table 4), the OLS results (first row) show small effects
that are hardly statistically significant. The FE results (second row) uncover a stronger
and statistically significant effect in 2012–13 and a positive one in 2011–12, but not statis-
tically significant. When we use (third row) fixed covariates and their interaction with the
time trend (captured by a second year dummy specific to each subsample), we find a posi-
tive effect in 2010–11 and 2011–12, around 0.07% increase in employment with a 10% in-
crease in per capita payments. In this specification, payments seemed to have had a
negative effect on employment in 2008–09. The estimates obtained by using the Belloni
et al. (2014) selection procedure (fourth row) are very similar to those obtained with the
full set of fi′ variables (the tables with the estimates for the covariates are available in the
Additional file 1). The estimated impact on employment between 2010 and 2012 is not
strong, but not negligible. In those years, the average per-capita payment across the LLMs
was 143 euros, with an average population of 63,000 and an average total employment of
19,000. This implies that an increase by 10% in the expenditure for the average LLM
would have increased its employment by approximately 13 units. Calculating the total in-
crease in expenditure at the average population (14.3 times 63,000), the cost per add-
itional unit of employment would have been around 68,000 euros. The variability of per
capita payments was actually quite high in those years, so it is interesting to evaluate the
Table 4 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth in employment
Dep. var.: annual growth in
employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Test for (1)-(5)
jointly zero (p-val)2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13
OLS
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0009 0.0031* −0.0023 0.0002 0.0041* 0.0034
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0023)
LLM FE
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0045 0.0035 0.0042 0.0121 0.0212*** 0.0742
(0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0083) (0.0074)
With fi′ and fi′ × 1[second year]
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0034* 0.0016 0.0069** 0.0079** 0.0024 0.0250
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0032)
With selected covariates (double selection)
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0043** 0.0014 0.0074** 0.0067* 0.0049 0.0291
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0034)
Obs 650 650 650 650 650
Note:
Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. See Tables 1–2 for other info. The “double selection” has been
conducted separately for each couple of years. See Additional file 1: Table S3 for the coefficients on these variables
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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euros, around 70% of the average). This would imply an increase in employment by
around 0.37%, which is 70 units if evaluated at the average.8 Overall, the acceleration/
retargeting of the payments that started in 2011 seemed to have caused a modest rise in
employment (which however loses momentum starting from 2012).
If we focus on population (Table 5), there is no difference with our previous results,
pointing to an overall ineffectiveness. OLS uncover some relations, but all other esti-
mates are neither statistically, nor economically significant. With respect to houseTable 5 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth in population
Dep. var.: annual growth in
population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Test for (1)-(5)
jointly zero (p-val)2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13
OLS
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0002 0.0003 0.0014** 0.0012** 0.0011** 0.0082
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
LLM FE
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0003 0.0000 0.0014 0.5489
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010)
With fi′ and fi′ × 1[sec ond year]
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0003 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.7046
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
With selected covariates (double selection)
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0005* 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0000 0.0003 0.3452
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Obs 650 650 650 650 650
Note:
Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. See Tables 1–2 for other info. The “double selection” has been
conducted separately for each couple of years. See Additional file 1: Table S4 for the coefficients on these variables
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
Table 6 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth in house prices
Dep. var.: annual growth in
house price per sqm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Test for (1)-(5)
jointly zero (p-val)2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13
OLS
ln(annual per capita payments)t 0.0037* 0.0054*** −0.0006 −0.0030 −0.0081*** 0.0000
(0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0022)
LLM FE
ln(annual per capita payments)t 0.0032 0.0285*** −0.0017 0.0042 −0.0026 0.0025
(0.0039) (0.0075) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0031)
With fi′ and fi′ × 1[second year]
ln(annual per capita payments)t −0.0022 0.0022 0.0020 −0.0034 −0.0066* 0.3003
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0037)
With selected covariates (double selection)
ln(annual per capita payments)t 0.0034 0.0118*** 0.0068* −0.0030 −0.0065* 0.0143
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Obs 650 650 650 650 650
Note:
Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. See Tables 1–2 for other info. The “double selection” has been conducted
separately for each couple of years. See Additional file 1: Table S5 for the coefficients on these variables
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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one (but statistically significant only at the 10% level) in 2012–13. The effect in
2009–10 is recovered when we use only selected covariates, but it actually disappears
(without a decrease in the precision of the estimates) when we include the full set of
covariates and interactions with the time trend.9
7.3 Is there any difference according to the type of programs?
Projects funded by EU Structural Funds are heterogeneous. Broadly speaking, they refer to
four categories: (i) payments for the purchase of goods and services; (ii) incentives for firms
and workers; (iii) payments for infrastructural projects; and (iv) other expenditures (pur-
chase of stocks or other capital transfers). For the first category, during each year between
2008 and 2013, there were positive payments in all LLMs, although 9.5% of the LLMs had
payments smaller than one euro per-capita in 2008. Payments related to incentives were 0
only in 4.3% of the LLM-year observations (concentrated in 2008, where they represented
the 24.3%), with an additional 3.2% smaller than one euro per-capita. Payments for infra-
structures were 0 in 6.9% of the cases, while they were negative (due to reimbursements
relative to projects that had been stopped) only for 1.1% of the observations. An additional
9.9% were smaller than one euro per-capita. In all these cases we impose the log to be equal
to zero. We ignore the last category (other expenditures) because it amounted to 2.8% of
total cumulative payments in 2013, with the majority of LLM-year observations equal to 0.
In Table 7 we estimate the impact of the different kinds of expenditures by replicating
the year-to-year specifications of Table 2. Fixed-effect estimates suggest a small but
positive effect of purchase of goods and services and incentives on employment
(Column 1). For the payments relative to the purchase of goods and services there is
evidence that the strict exogeneity condition required for fixed effects to be consistent
is violated. Nevertheless, positive though smaller impacts are uncovered also through
Table 7 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth, 2008–13. Heterogeneity with respect to the kind of payments
Annual 2008–13 growth in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(annual pc payments for
goods and services purchase)t
0.0062*** 0.0047*** 0.0031** −0.0008*** −0.0002 0.0000 0.0044 0.0030 0.0024
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0021)
ln(annual pc payments for
ncentives)t
0.0032*** 0.0020* 0.0027*** −0.0000 −0.0002 −0.0003* 0.0007 0.0013 0.0000
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0013)
ln(annual pc payments for
infrastructural projects)t
0.0000 0.0009 0.0002 −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0013 −0.0012* −0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Additional controls
LLM FE
All fi′; Chosen by double
selection
LLM FE
All fi′; Chosen by double
selection
LLM FE
All fi′; Chosen by double
selection
fi′ × t; fi′ × t; fi′ × t;
fi′ × t
2 fi′ × t
2 fi′ × t
2
Obs 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950
R2 0.2420 0.3452 0.2471 0.1566 0.6751 0.6093 0.3284 0.5191 0.3418
Strict exog test for:
- Goods and services 0.0005 0.0934 0.0006
- Incentives 0.2651 0.5723 0.2803
- Infrastructural projects 0.9358 0.9287 0.0364
Note:
Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. See Tables 1–2 for other info. The strict exogeneity test is the p-value for a test for H0: ln(annual payment for …)t+1 = 0. Columns (1), (4), (7) include only LLM FE, with
no additional controls. Controls in columns (3), (6), (9) have been selected using the “double selection” of Belloni et al. (2014) and the code provided by the authors
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(Columns 2 and 3). On the other hand, the payments related to infrastructural projects
do not show any impact on local employment. The results referring to the population
and house prices growth (from Column 4 to Column 9) do not signal any interesting
pattern attributable to the different types of projects.
One possible reason for the positive effect associated with the first two categories of
spending is that their impact is more likely to be found over a short-term period. This
could be particularly true for some categories of incentives that address the crisis-
induced difficulties of the firms, such as wage-supplementation schemes and public
credit guarantees. Differently, infrastructure is more likely to impact over the longer
run and therefore its effect may not be detected by our analysis. Moreover, disburse-
ments referred to infrastructures generally pre-date the moment in which the public
goods are completed (so to trigger economic effects on our outcomes).
Given that the logarithm of infrastructural spending displays a large mass of year-
LLM observation at zero, we also tried to run the regressions looking at the effect of
the cumulate 2007–13 spending on the average growth during the period (similarly to
Table 3). In this case, all LLMs have positive payments (larger than one euro per capita)
for the three kinds of spending. For infrastructural projects, these regressions (available
on request) still display close to zero coefficients for the effects on employment and
population, and a negative one on house prices (0.05% decrease with a 10% increase in
payments). As could be expected, in this case also the other two categories of spending
show no relation with the outcomes, probably because the short term effect on
employment is hardly captured without properly modeling the underlying annual
trends. Only population appears to be slightly positively affected by the purchase of
goods and services.7.4 Slackness in housing and labor market
A standard spatial equilibrium model, as in Kline and Moretti (2013a), suggests that
the effect on population mobility and house prices depends on the elasticity of local
labor and housing supply. For instance, in a scenario of low employment, additional
labor demand generated by transfers may increase the local employment rate without
attracting population from other areas. Real estate prices are also more likely to change
if there is a shortage of housing supply, so that the increase in income and/or popula-
tion will increase rents. We broadly test whether the implications of the spatial equilib-
rium model apply in our data by constructing two simple indicators of labor and
housing market slackness. The first is a dummy variable for the lowest quintile of em-
ployment rate in 2007, which should capture those areas that have a larger availability
of potential labor supply. The second is an indicator for the lowest quintile of housing
prices in 2007, which should capture the availability of affordable housing.
Table 8 shows the results from regressions for annual growth that also include inter-
actions between the flow of payments and the indicators for slackness in housing and
labor market (plus the main effect of these two variables in regressions without FE).
We fail to find any evidence of a differential effect on employment (Columns 1–3).
When using fixed effects (Column 4) or “double selected” LLM characteristics (Column
6), population seems to be negatively affected on average, but the presence of affordable
Table 8 The effects of European Structural Funds on annual growth, 2008–13. Heterogeneity with respect to slackness in the housing and labor markets
Annual 2008–13 growth
in:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(annual pc payments)t 0.0027 −0.0008 0.0010 −0.0006*** −0.0001 −0.0005** 0.0064** 0.0021 0.0035
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0022)
ln(annual pc payments)t ×
housing slack indicator
0.0012 0.0032 0.0020 0.0005* 0.0004 0.0007** −0.0066* −0.0022 −0.0064*
(0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0034)
ln(annual pc payments)t ×
labor mkt slack indicator
−0.0011 0.0049* −0.0007 0.0002 −0.0002 0.0000 0.0100*** −0.0007 0.0076**
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Housing slack indicator −0.0150 −0.0118 −0.0022 −0.0041** 0.0183 0.0381**
(0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0142) (0.0155)
Labor mkt slack indicator −0.0214* 0.0057 0.0026 0.0006 0.0054 −0.0321**
(0.0126) (0.0099) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0129) (0.0142)
Additional controls LLM FE All fi′; Chosen by double
selection
LLM FE All fi′; Chosen by double
selection
LLM FE All fi′; Chosen by double
x`selection
fi′ × t; fi′ × t; fi′ × t;
fi′ × t
2 fi′ × t
2 fi′ × t
2
Obs 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950
R2 0.2352 0.3415 0.2366 0.1550 0.6771 0.5973 0.3368 0.5191 0.3167
Note:
Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. See Table 2 for other info. The housing slack indicator is a dummy for the lowest quintile of housing prices across all LLMs in 2007. The labor market slack is a dummy
for the lowest quintile of employment rate in 2007. Columns (1), (4), (7) include only LLM FE, with no additional controls. To avoid introducing an additional source of variation, controls in columns (3), (6), (9) are the
same selected for Table 2
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fi′ variables are similar but not significant at the usual levels). The housing slackness
(Columns 7–9) seems also to have a counteracting effect on the evolution of housing
prices (but statistically significant only at the 10% level). Differently, the labor market
slackness is associated with a positive effect of the European funds, which is a result
that does not lend credit to the implications of the spatial equilibrium model.7.5 Faster disbursements?
A recurring argument in the Italian policy debate on Structural Funds refers to the
actual capacity of spending the available EU money. For instance, for Southern Italy, at
the end of 2013, only roughly 50% of the resources available for the 2007–13 program-
ing period was spent. A popular argument is that if local authorities would have been
able to spend all the available EU money, then the economic consequences of the crisis
could have been less dramatic. We have already highlighted that the acceleration of
funding achieved with the “Piano di Azione and Coesione” may have had only a
reduced impulse on employment starting from 2011. In this Section, we study whether
those LLMs that have been able to spend the most of the allocated money have shown
better performances compared with their less efficient counterparts.
To this purpose, in Table 9 we focus on the average growth 2008–13 and replace
the variable of interest, which is taken now to be the fraction of available funds that
have been spent by the end of 2013.10 The results are extremely similar to those we
found in the baseline estimates of Table 3.11 It does not seem, therefore, that those
LLM who spent a larger fraction of the available funding experienced higher effective-
ness of the interventions.7.6 Interactions with national funding
As discussed in Section 4, during 2007–13 there were also cohesion projects entirely
funded by national sources. These concurrent programs are likely not going to make a
difference for the estimated effectiveness of EU funding: they amount to 3.1% of the EU
transfers we have considered up to now. In any case, in Table 10 we add per-capita pay-
ments relative to nationally-funded programs in the regressions. We focused on the aver-
age growth specification because these funds are more limited and therefore in some
years they amount to zero for the vast majority of LLMs.12 On the whole period, the
LLMs with less than one euro per-capita of expenditure from these funds are 43 (13%; 11
LLMs have zero payments), and we recode their logarithm to zero. Results without this
correction (excluding those with zero payments) and results for annual growth (imposing
the logarithm to be zero) lead to similar conclusions and are available on request.
Table 10 shows that the expenditure related to national sources is unrelated to all three
outcomes (apart from a marginally statistically and economically significant relation with
employment found in Column 1). It is therefore not surprising that the estimated effects
of the EU funds are extremely similar to the main estimates provided in Table 2.7.7 Absorptive capacity: heterogeneity by human capital
Becker et al. (2013) find that regions characterized by lower human capital and/or qual-
ity of institutions are less able to reap the gains of European transfers, even if they
Table 9 The effects of the usage of European Structural Funds on average 2008–13 growth,
controlling for LLM time invariant characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average 2008–2013 growth in:
Employment Population House price per sqm
Fraction of funds used
in 2007–13 ([0–1] scale)
0.0004 −0.0051 −0.0005 −0.0015 −0.0299*** −0.0411***
(0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0114) (0.0107)
Controls selected by the double selection procedure:
ln(allocated per
capita funds)
−0.0156 −0.0030** 0.0023 0.0001 −0.0134 0.0000





−0.0017 0.0004 0.0017*** 0.0112**
(0.0022) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0048)
ln(house price
per sqm)2005
0.0543*** 0.0052*** −0.0002 0.0123
(0.0183) (0.0017) (0.0054) (0.0309)
ln(employment)2006 0.1354 −0.0466 0.0005*** 1.6803***
(0.2105) (0.0552) (0.0002) (0.3537)
ln(house price
per sqm)2006
0.0010 0.0015 −0.1567*** −0.0300***
(0.0160) (0.0051) (0.0333) (0.0036)
Empl rate2007 0.4741 −0.0038 0.1419 0.0032 1.5045 0.2700***
(0.9156) (0.0181) (0.2766) (0.0055) (2.2212) (0.0378)
ln(house price
per sqm)2007
−0.0666** 0.0260*** 0.0007 0.0235
(0.0284) (0.0083) (0.0005) (0.0917)
Population
growth 2004-07
−0.3565 0.2178*** 0.0806 0.2144*** −0.3818

















Obs 325 325 325 325 325 325
R2 0.5031 0.2695 0.8396 0.7778 0.4862 0.2429
Note:
The unit of observation is the LLM over time. See Table 1 for data sources. The regressions include a constant. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The average change over 2008–13 is calculated as a geometric average. fi′ is a vector of
pre-determined covariates (see Table 2). Controls in columns (2), (4), (6) have been selected using the “double selection”
of Belloni et al. (2014) and the code provided by the authors. Columns (1), (3), (5) include all fi′, but only coefficients on
those that are also “double selected” are shown (a full regression table is available from the authors)
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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amount of financing.
With respect to the quality of institutions, we unfortunately cannot obtain good enough
proxies, given that we would need data at the municipality level in order to aggregate
them by LLM. To the best of our knowledge, only Barone and Mocetti (2011) developed
an indicator of public spending efficiency at this level, but the indicator is available only
for a subsample (approximately one fifth) of municipalities for which the required data
were available. This prevents us from building a reasonably good proxy given that we
would also have to aggregate the different municipalities included in each LLM.
Differently, the 2001 Census allows us to recover the fraction of the population aged
6 or more with at least a high school diploma. Similarly to Becker et al. (2013), we take
them as deviations from the average across Southern LLM, and we add this to the




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(cumulative per capita
payments 07–13)
-0.0007 -0.0037 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0113** -0.0095**




0.0008* 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0006 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Additional controls All fi′ Chosen by
double selection
All fi′ Chosen by
double selection
All fi′ Chosen by
double
selection
Obs 325 325 325 325 325 325
R2 0.5091 0.2721 0.8407 0.7771 0.4846 0.1146
Note:
The regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See Table 2 for other info. To avoid introducing an
additional source of variation, controls in columns (2), (4), (6) are the same selected for Table 3
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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gressions, the interaction term is positive for employment and house prices, but small
in economic terms and not statistically significant. It is generally negative for popula-
tion, but marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level) only when we add the full
set of covariates (results available on request). The patterns are less clear in the average
growth specification, but still neither statistically nor economically significant. The
aggregate results about the effect of European transfer payments does not seem, there-
fore, to display a significant heterogeneity by human capital.
This is not necessarily inconsistent with Becker et al. (2013). Indeed, their method allows
them to compute, for each country, the share of Objective 1 regions whose human-capital
and institutional quality is sufficient for displaying a positive effect of European transfers.
For Italy, none of the regions satisfy the criteria for displaying an effect on GDP per-capita
growth. Half of them meet the required threshold for a positive effect on investment, but
with large statistical imprecision in the potential effect (idem, pg. 57). It is therefore not
surprising that the differences of human capital within Southern Italy are not, according to
our results, sufficient to generate a sensible heterogeneity in the effects.
7.8 Specification issues
In the year-to-year regressions we focused on the contemporary (annual) effects.
However, the impact of the payments may take some time to materialize. In Table 11 we
re-estimate the regression for annual growth including two lags of the logarithm of per-
capita payments.14 In order to do this, we need to focus only on the 2010–2013 period.
In Table 11, columns (1)–(3) show a small but positive effect of the current annual
payments on employment, while no effect is found on population or prices. Crucially,
lags exhibit minor and not statistically significant coefficients on employment. The first
lag seems to have a negative and very modest effect on population and again a negative,
but larger effect on house prices. However, both estimates are imprecise and statistically
significant only at the 10% level. Two-year lags are neither economically nor statistically
significant. All in all, taking aboard past disbursements seems not to add significantly to
the overall picture of ineffectiveness.





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(annual pc
payments)t
0.0113*** 0.0062** 0.0076*** −0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 −0.0016 −0.0010 0.0021
(0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0026)
ln(annual pc
payments)t-1
0.0001 −0.0017 −0.0017 −0.0006* −0.0005* −0.0005* −0.0077* −0.0020 −0.0060*
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0033)
ln(annual pc
payments)t −2
0.0002 −0.0000 −0.0010 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0021 0.0038 0.0001
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0040) (0.0024) (0.0020)
Additional
controls
LLM FE All fi′; Chosen by
double
selection
LLM FE All fi′; Chosen by
double
selection
LLM FE All fi′; Chosen
by double
selectionfi′ × t; fi′ × t; fi′ × t;
fi′ × t
2 fi′ × t
2 fi′ × t
2
Obs 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
Note:
See Table 2 for other info. Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. Columns (1), (4), (7) include only LLM FE,
with no additional controls. To avoid introducing an additional source of variation, controls in columns (3), (6), (9) are the
same selected for Table 2
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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of the level of the outcome with respect to payments related to EU projects. In this case,
we need to account at the same time for LLM fixed effects and for heterogeneous time
trend. The equivalent of the FE regression for the annual growth in the outcomes is:
yit ¼ exp δ ln ditð Þ þ γt þ ui þ gi  t
 
ηit ð14Þ
E ηis ln ditð Þ; γt; ui;gi  t
  ¼ 1 ∀s; t; ð15Þ
which can be estimated using Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood (PMQL, seeSantos-Silva and Tenreyro 2006 for a general discussion and Ciani and Fisher, 2014,
for the dif-in-dif case).15 The coefficient δ can be interpreted as the elasticity of the
outcome with respect to the per-capita payments. In line with previous estimates, we
can also allow for higher order heterogeneous time trends by using the interaction
between time trends and fixed time variables and select them using Belloni et al.'s
(2014) “double selection.”16 In this case we show only regressions with the selected
variables because Poisson regressions with the entire set do not converge due to the
large set of covariates.
Table 12 displays the results. No effect is detected for any of the outcomes, in line with
the main results.8 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that EU Structural Funds disbursed in the South of Italy between
2007 and 2013 had only a limited impact on local measures for employment, popula-
tion, and house prices. Modest effects on employment are only uncovered for the accel-
eration/retargeting of payment that started in 2011. Short term effects seem to be
associated with the EU money channeled through incentives and the purchase of goods
and services. A relevant upshot of our empirical investigation refers to the so called
financial execution of the budgets, an issue hotly debated in policy circles. We do not
Table 12 The elasticity of the current level of outcomes with respect to European Structural Fund
payments, 2008-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Employment Population House price per sqm
ln(annual pc
payments)t
0.0031 0.0048 −0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0065 −0.0025



























Obs 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950
Note:
See Table 2 for other info. Standard errors clustered for LLM in parentheses. Estimates obtained using Poisson Quasi
Maximum Likelihood. Controls in columns (3), (6), (9) have been chosen using the “double selection” method (Belloni
et al. 2014, and the code provided by the authors) on the reduced forms for ln(annual pc payments)t and for the
logarithm of the outcome. Coefficients on selected covariates are available on request
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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the local economic outcomes that we consider. A joint reading of two results, the one
related to the 2011 “Piano di Azione e Coesione” and the one referring to the speed of the fi-
nancial execution would suggest that the effects of the former are mostly related to the re-
focusing rather than the acceleration per se. Overall, our findings underscore that the
targets and design of the interventions have to be reformed to increase their effectiveness.
It is worth mentioning, though, the two main caveats of our exercise. Firstly, our esti-
mates are basically diff-in-diffs estimates, where the treatment is taken to be continu-
ous. In this set-up, and because of the concomitant severe economic crisis, the main
challenge is to reduce the role of omitted time-varying variables. We try to accomplish
this job by controlling for an extensive list of LLM-specific traits that should help in
predicting local trends. Obviously, one cannot be ensured that all the sources of local
dynamics are successfully differentiated away, even though we control for all the local
traits that should reasonably have a role in explaining the severity of the crisis in a
given local context. We also believe that the limitations of the empirical framework we
adopt should be weighed against the benefits of having timely empirical evidence on
the effectiveness of the 2007–13 EU Structural Funds. Having such evidence while the
design of the interventions for the next programing period (2014–20) of the EU Struc-
tural Funds is under way should be extremely valuable for policy making.
Secondly, we focus on a single area, the South of Italy, that has been severely hit by
the economic crisis. The extent to which our results might provide lessons for other
EU countries or timespan with less dramatic economic conditions is something that is
left to further inquiries. Furthermore, as we currently have to limit our analysis to the
six years of the programing period, future research projects can try to study whether
stronger effects might be found in the longer run.Endnotes
1The definition was built using the same algorithm previously used in 1991 (Istat
1997). The 2001 map was recently revised using the new method that was implemented
starting with the 2011 Census (see http://www.istat.it/en/archive/142790; last access:
Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:20 Page 29 of 3130/06/2015). At the moment of writing, the data at the local level that have been used
in this paper are not available for this new definition.
2Because of the dramatic economic crisis, we are mostly concerned with the down-
ward bias due to time-varying omitted at the local level. Obviously, one could also im-
agine that the bias goes in the other direction. For instance, the most efficient local
administrations could have obtained more money, as the EU programs managed by
them were executed in a faster way.
3These variables have been included in the spirit of Bartik (1991), who calculates local
shocks by interacting the begin-of-the-period industry composition with the nation-
wide changes and industry-specific changes in employment. The data were obtained
from the ASIA archive, which collects the entire population of private sector firms and
plants. Unfortunately, these data are not currently available at the industry-LLM level
for 2013. See Section 7.1 for the discussion of results using ASIA to build an alternative
outcome variable.
4We used the Stata program lassoShooting written by them.
5www.opencoesione.gov.it
6In some cases, the projects contain information about multiple geographical levels.
For example, it may list both a set of municipalities and some provinces (or an entire
region). In these cases, we chose to give priority to the information pertaining to the most
disaggregated level. For instance, in the example just discussed, we only considered the
municipalities explicitly mentioned, ignoring the information on provinces or regions.
7Another region, Basilicata, is in the phasing out phase.
8The calculation for the growth in employment is performed as 0.007 (the coefficient
on logarithm payments) times the logarithm of 1.7 (170%). The cost per unit increase
evaluated at the average would be somewhat larger (90,000 euros) than the one for a 10
percent increase in payments.
9One potential concern with the procedure of sample-splitting implemented in
Tables 4–6 is that some statistically significant results are likely to be found also by
chance. To address this concern, for each estimation method, we jointly test the null that
the coefficients on log payments is equal to zero in all couples of years. P-values are gen-
erally in line with the conclusions described in the text (see last columns of Tables 4–6).
10Given that the explicative variable changes, we run again the “double selection”
procedure, but the selected covariates ended up to be the same as in Table 2.
11In the baselines, however, we use the disbursements as variable of interest but we
also controlled for the allocations.
12To avoid introducing different sources of variation in the results, we keep the same
list of covariates as in Table 2.
13Becker et al. (2013) used the fraction of workers holding at least a high school dip-
loma. Unfortunately, ISTAT does not release data on workers’ education at the LLM
level, neither from the 2001 Census nor from the annual Labour Force Survey.
14Payments may also arrive after the projects have been carried out. In this case, we
may want to study the effect of the first lead of the main explicative variables. Note,
however, that we have already tested the significance of a lead as part of the test for
strict exogeneity in the FE equations and it was never significant.
15The alternative is to log-linearize the model and use OLS. However, this
method, although standard, is biased under heteroskedasticity, which instead does
Ciani and de Blasio IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:20 Page 30 of 31not affect the consistency of PQMLE (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Ciani and
Fisher 2014).
16Formally, the equation becomes (being in levels, we keep the LLM fixed effects):
yit ¼ exp δ ln ditð Þ þ γt þ ui þ t  f i0φ1 þ t2  f i0φ2 þ t3  f i0φ3
 
ηit
E ηit ln ditð Þ; γt ; f i0; t
  ¼ 1
For the selection of covariates, although there are methods for the non-linear cases,
here we simplify by log-linearizing the two reduced forms (this is potentially biased, see
footnote 15).
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